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Anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving: sex and the ‘irredeemable’ 




The work of Andrea Dworkin and Catharine A. MacKinnon on sex and sexuality has 
often been posed as adversary to the development of queer theory. Leo Bersani, in 
particular, is critical of the normative ambitions of their work, which he sees firstly as 
trying to ‘redeem’ sex acts themselves, and secondly as advocating for sexuality as a 
site of potential for social transformation. In this article, I argue that this is a 
misreading of their work. Drawing on Dworkin’s wide body of writing, and the early 
Signs essays of MacKinnon, I suggest that their work makes no such case for sex or 
sexuality. Rather, by bringing their analysis into conversation with Halberstam’s 
recent work on ‘shadow feminism’, I contend that Dworkin and MacKinnon’s anti-
social, anti-pastoral and distinctly anti-normative vision of sex and sexuality shares 
many of the same features of queer theory, ultimately advocating for sex as 
‘irredeemable’.  
 
Key words: Andrea Dworkin, Catharine A. MacKinnon, second-wave feminism, 
anti-social queer theory, sex, sexuality  
 
Introduction 
In Leo Bersani’s early text, Is The Rectum a Grave?, he argues that gay male 
sexuality takes pleasure in precisely the demeaning sexual subjugation of women that 
radical feminists argued lies at the root of women’s inequality. Bersani specifically 
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addresses Catharine A. MacKinnon’s argument in her early essay in Signs, and by 
proxy the work of Andrea Dworkin, and embraces their equation between being 
penetrated and powerlessness as a means of understanding gay men’s erotic pleasures. 
Although published in the same year as IRG, Bersani might as well have drawn on 
this particular moment in Dworkin’s Intercourse:  
Women feel the fuck – when it works, when it overwhelms – as 
possession; and feel possession as deeply erotic; and value 
annihilation of the self in sex as proof of the man’s desire or love, 
its awesome intensity (…) sex itself is an experience of diminishing 
self-possession, an erosion of self.1  
Counterintuitively, Bersani celebrates the demeaning powerlessness in ‘sex itself’ and 
the annihilation of self that is its result. He also recognises the queer potential that 
underpins Dworkin and MacKinnon’s thesis: 
Their indictment of sex - their refusal to prettify it, to romanticize it, to 
maintain that fucking has anything to do with community or love - has 
had the immensely desirable effect of publicizing, of lucidly laying out for 
us, the inestimable value of sex as - at least in certain of its ineradicable 
aspects – anticommunal, antiegalitarian, antinurturing, antiloving. 2  
While admiring the descriptive content of Dworkin and MacKinnon’s work on sex, 
however, Bersani repudiates both feminist theory and LGBT studies for reifying the 
idea that sexuality has a role to play in transforming the social, or is always theorized 
‘in terms of its relations to other systems of stratification’.3 He erases the possibility 
that there is anything redeemable in (homo)sexuality which speaks to reconfiguring or 
challenging the indexes of social power.4 The value of sex, its threat to psychic 
wholeness, and its rejection of any ties to utopian socialities, is to undermine any 
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attempts to redeem it. The suggestion that we can fuck our way to queer utopia is, he 
suggests, precisely what sexuality itself destabilises. This desire to ‘redeem’ sexuality 
through profoundly altering its system of value is Bersani’s postured point of 
departure from Dworkin and MacKinnon. He writes:  ‘what bothers me about 
MacKinnon and Dworkin is not their analysis of sexuality, but rather the 
pastoralizing, redemptive intentions that support the analysis (215).’  
While Bersani is careful to distinguish between the analysis of sexuality that 
we now recognise as radical feminist description of intercourse, and the normative 
ambitions of their analysis of sex, he is quite clear that he positions their ambitions 
within a general trajectory in sexualities studies: the redemptive reinvention of sex 
(215, emphasis his). Repudiating Bersani’s claim, I will argue that there is nothing 
pastoral about the vision of sexuality that is often attributed to Dworkin or 
MacKinnon’s work, nor is it their intention  to redeem ‘sex itself’. In the midst of the 
feminist sex wars of the 1980s, in which pleasure and danger were considered the 
antithetical axes of understanding of sexuality through sex-radical feminism and 
radical feminism, for Dworkin and MacKinnon victimization stands in for 
womanhood, and danger is the presumed lens through which sexuality is viewed by 
women. Thus, the argument goes, to liberate women’s sexuality, male danger must be 
eradicated.5 Yet, at the same time, a number of sex-positive feminists suggest that the 
normative elements of radical feminist work designate sexuality as beyond 
redemption. As Gatens has written, for Dworkin and MacKinnon, sexual ethics are 
‘always already foredoomed’.6 Charged on the one hand with ill-conceived attempts 
to redeem sex, and on the other, with an essentialist preoccupation with the mechanics 
of heterosexual intercourse which ultimately sows the seeds for the impossibility of a 
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feminist sexual integrity,7 neither author is permitted the complexity that marks their 
work, and its proto-queer qualities.  
As will become evident, while there is a stronger case to make for Dworkin as 
an anti-normative queer feminist, I will argue that neither her vision of sexuality nor 
MacKinnnon’s promotes its redemption. As we will see, each affirms the idea, later 
developed by Bersani, that sex is irredeemable on two counts. Firstly, neither 
advocates that social transformation is achievable through a reconfiguration of the 
contours of heterosexual intercourse. Secondly, I contend that their work possesses no 
normative or prescriptive preoccupation with redeeming the content of sex acts 
themselves, or that it reifies the ‘feminine’.  
   
Pleasure in Danger: Revisiting Sex in MacKinnon and Dworkin  
For many feminist and queer scholars, Dworkin and MacKinnon’s indictment of 
sexuality, and their claim that gender is produced through the very mechanics of 
intercourse, is so determinist as to foreclose entirely any erotic imaginary for women 
that might operate in their interests. This reading has arguably developed from two 
well-cited instances in their writing, which have been decontextualized to the point 
that they come to operate as a stand-in for all radical feminist writing on sexuality. In 
Dworkin’s work, this moment arises in Intercourse, when she writes: 
A human being has a body that is inviolate; and when it is violated, it is 
abused. A woman has a body that is penetrated in intercourse: permeable, 
its corporeal solidness a lie. The discourse of male truth – literature, 
science, philosophy, pornography – calls that penetration violation. This it 
does with some consistency and some confidence. Violation is a synonym 
for intercourse. (143-4) 
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Unfortunately, this quotation is often reduced to its final sentence, removing the most 
crucial point. In a quasi-Foucauldian gesture,8 Dworkin is clear here that it is the 
hierarchisation of discourse, in which hegemonically masculine iterations of 
intercourse are most highly valued, that have produced intercourse as violation 
representationally.  
While much more ink has been spilt on MacKinnon’s attempts to take the 
methodological trappings of Marxism and apply them to the dynamics of gender, a 
similar point might be made about accusations of essentialism attributed to 
MacKinnon’s theory of sexuality. In Feminism Unmodified, she argues that ‘the 
social relation between the sexes is organised so that men may dominate and women 
must submit and this relation is sexual – in fact, is sex.’9 Again, the most crucial 
aspect of this quotation is often ignored: that it is the organisation of the sexes (and 
MacKinnon lays much of the blame squarely at the feet of liberal legalism for reifying 
this organisation) which produces a ‘thing called sexuality’. More specifically, 
however, MacKinnon makes clear in her earlier Signs essay that it is the (hetero)sexist 
social order that has generated the ‘eroticisation of potency (as male) and 
victimisation (as female)’ (FMMSAT, 526).  
This view of heterosexuality’s status as a social institution, and the power of 
discourse to produce sexual categories and norms, would not be considered 
particularly controversial by most queer theorists. What MacKinnon and Dworkin 
describe is fairly straightforwardly a critique of the institutionalisation of 
heteronormativity and its dominion over women’s sexuality, specifically through a 
critique of the history of literary representation (Dworkin) and legal form 
(MacKinnon). But while MacKinnon and Dworkin’s work proffers a totalising view 
of the coercive properties of sexuality, its distinctively antinormative qualities have 
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been undermined due to its association with a certain strand of feminist activism at 
the time in which they published this work, and their later involvement in it. As Janet 
Halley notes of MacKinnon, there is a distinction between the MacKinnon of these 
early Signs essays, whose normative intention was to consciousness-raise on the 
institutionalisation of heterosexuality, particularly within the law of rape, and the 
MacKinnon who sought legal reform to advocate for a regulation of male dominance, 
and women’s sexual liberation.10  
I concur with Halley that the reading of MacKinnon as a legal reformist is 
premised on her association with the anti-pornography and anti-SM lobby operating 
in the early 1980s, which quite clearly did make a case for sexuality as normatively 
redeemable. This inevitably makes it difficult to read her earlier work without, as 
Halley does, retrospectively seeing the spectre of Mackinnon the legal reformist in 
these texts. However, by reading MacKinnon alongside Dworkin, we can better see 
the grains of anti-normativity in her writing. West suggests that while the anti-
pornography movements became overly concerned with the content of women’s 
sexual desires,11 this was never at the centre of Mackinnon’s writing. West urges that 
radical feminism should drop the critique of desire, while queer theory should drop 
the critique of women’s ‘lack of desire’ (385). Thus, Bersani’s assumption that 
Dworkin and MacKinnon ultimately sought out not a way of explaining women’s lack 
of (heterosexist) desire, but a different world of erotic intimacy in which sexuality 
might be reimagined as egalitarian and pastoral, stems much more obviously from the 
reception of their work by sex-radical feminists, and the legal campaigns they would 
go on to head, than the texts themselves. In part, this might be because in the year in 
which Dworkin published Intercourse, and indeed, Bersani published IRG, cultural 
feminism was dominant amongst US feminists, which sought to revalue and promote 
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female sexuality, as it did femininity, as ‘muted, diffuse, interpersonally-oriented, and 
benign’.12  As Grant has written, when Intercourse was published its commitments to 
early radical feminist consciousness critique about sexuality and romance were 
considered ‘shocking’ in part because cultural feminism was in the process of 
attempting to revalorise the value of femininity.13  
 Despite this, it is not entirely true that all sex-radical feminists equated the 
vision of sexuality espoused by Dworkin and MacKinnon with the pastoral vision of 
communitarian intimacy we might now more readily associate with cultural feminists 
such as Carol Gilligan. In Pleasure and Danger, Echols recognised that the earlier 
work of radical feminists was much more concerned with romantic love, marriage and 
the nuclear family straitjacketing sexuality. Quoting an essay by Karen Lindsey, she 
makes clear that radical feminists certainly had no interest in sexual conservatism: 
‘We are, in fact, in danger of reverting to a rejection of sex without love – with all the 
self-denial, smugness, guilt and dishonesty that goes with such a rejection’.14 
Nevertheless, Echols still reverts to locating Dworkin under the rubric of cultural 
feminism. This is a mistake, since there is little indication in Dworkin’s writing that 
she maintained anything other than political disdain for romantic love, or its 
pastoralizing effects on femininity. In both Our Blood, and later, Right-Wing Women, 
Dworkin renounces the suggestion that femininity is simply in need of revaluation. In 
the former, she argues that femininity, in enculturated, male-imagined terms, is 
‘roughly synonymous with stupidity’.15 In the latter, this rejection of femininity is 
made even more explicit: ‘women have stupid ideas that do not deserve to be called 
ideas’.16 Dworkin decries women’s ‘ideas’ here as synonymous with the association 
of women’s intelligence as ‘small and timid’ (RWW, 41), and argues for a 
specifically ‘unladylike’ ‘sexual intelligence’ (53-6). While Dworkin’s condemnation 
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of feminine intelligence in these texts is a precursor to the claim we see above from 
Intercourse – about the discourses of ‘male truth’ and the ways in which it is a 
function of masculinity – as Palmer-Mehta has argued, Dworkin’s confrontational 
rhetorical style, as well as her approach to relationships, reveal an explicit rejection of 
the feminine and ideological trappings of heteronormativity.17  
 Similarly, Drucilla Cornell has vigorously critiqued MacKinnon’s refusal to 
revalue the feminine as a normative project. In her writing on pornography, 
MacKinnon suggests that the equation of the feminine with sexual object is 
impossible to reject: ‘Men’s power over women means that the way men see women 
defines who women can be (FU, 148).’ As Cornell notes, this requires women to 
either negate who they are, or affirm men’s perspectives (and it is this affirmation that 
I suspect leads Dworkin to equate femininity and stupidity). As she puts it, ‘for 
MacKinnon, it is profoundly mistaken to emphasise feminine difference as having 
value’,18 because it has the effect of privileging a masculine system of value that 
reduces the feminine to male definition. While, of course, the paradox of 
MacKinnon’s perspective is clear – if it is impossible to define women beyond male 
valuation, then how is it possible that she and Dworkin are themselves able to 
reappraise sexuality in the way they do? -- it is important to flag the distinction 
between the cultural feminist perspectives so often associated with their work, and the 
radical feminist perspective that in fact underpins it.  
More recently, a small number of articles have surfaced that both anoint 
Dworkin’s work with more serious consideration than she has historically been 
permitted, and work to recover the radicalism of her writing. Serisier argues that the 
representation of Dworkin in feminist and sexualities studies texts seems almost 
inevitably to cast her as an ‘archetypal character in a social morality play’.19 That 
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Dworkin herself fashioned this character – feminist as antagonist – as a fundamental 
property of her writing is echoed by Palmer-Mehta, who suggests that the ‘rhetorical 
strategy of confrontation’ (ADRE, 53) is used by Dworkin to rejects the politics of 
respectability. It is this quality of her work that has perhaps led to its denunciation. 
Taking a different tack, Allen has proposed that Dworkin’s work should be seen in 
tandem with Millett’s literary criticism, observing that we might re-read the feminist 
sex wars themselves as principally a debate about ‘the relation between representation 
and real life’.20 Cameron has also argued that Intercourse is quite explicitly a survey 
of the troubling representational strategy that accompanies intercourse, and the 
blueprint for sexuality that is produced as a consequence, rather than a descriptor of 
the material realities of sex.  
The rehabilitation of Dworkin as an underrated feminist literary critic and 
radical political provocateur goes some way to releasing her from the shackles of 
‘paranoid reading’21 that have befallen her writing. Equally, while her Signs essay on 
the law remains a mainstay of many undergraduate courses in Jurisprudence, 
MacKinnon’s early work on heterosexuality has received little of the same rereading. 
I suggest that in much of their writing, both MacKinnon and Dworkin were far more 
interested in revising the institutions, and the hegemony, of heterosexual intimacy 
than redeeming ‘sex itself’ (by profoundly altering its system of value), or in viewing 
sexuality as a locus for social transformation (the suggestion, repudiated by Bersani, 
that sexuality has the power to fundamentally shift the terms of the social). For 
Dworkin this rested principally on undoing and deconstructing the representational 
discourses of intercourse-as-violation and the deficit in ‘sexual intelligence’ permitted 
women, while MacKinnon’s interest lay primarily in legal discourse, and liberal 
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legalism’s ‘objective’ coercive and controlling treatment of women as men treat 
women.22  
 
Anti-Loving: Sex and Negativity 
So far, I have illustrated that the charge often laid at MacKinnon and Dworkin’s 
doors, that their vision of sexuality-as-violation is an essentialist descriptor of 
materialist reality, is at least partially false. Both authors grounded their social-
constructionist (Dworkin) and structuralist (MacKinnon) theories of sexuality in a 
critique of heteronormativity, and particularly of marriage and reproduction 
associated with earlier radical feminism. But this does not account for their anti-
normative approach to sex. Eliza Glick has argued that the failure of both radical and 
pro-sex feminism lies in their opposing but similarly liberatory perspectives on female 
sexuality. In radical feminists, she assumes a desire for ‘a sexuality purified of male 
sexual aggression and violence’ (SP, 21), while in pro-sex feminism, a desire for an 
eradication of the system of value that leaves no room for ‘benign sexual variation’.23 
In each of these designations of the ‘sides’ of the sex wars we see some normative 
suggestion that sexuality is a site of social transformation. While pro-sex feminism’s 
vision of sexual liberation undoubtedly nails its rainbow colours to the mast of sexual 
liberation via transgressive, non-reproductive and undoubtedly anti-pastoral sexual 
content, both camps, Glick argues, ultimately accept that sex is nice and pleasure is 
good for you. She is right to note that this normative ambition of some radical 
feminism makes it difficult to truly call the latter camp, as it often gets labelled, ‘sex-
negative’.   
Yet, it is the sex-negativity of MacKinnon and Dworkin that Bersani was to 
suggest formed the basis, indeed the conditions, for his own work. As Millbank points 
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out, MacKinnon and Dworkin’s writing does advocate for a certain ‘sex-negativity’ 
that flouted both compulsory sexuality and sexual morality for women. Millbank 
argues that sex-radical feminism tended only to critique the first of these, and 
conflates claims on the part of second-wave writers about compulsory sexuality with 
sexual morality.24  Halley also mistakes this tendency in MacKinnon’s early 
scholarship. She recognises that Bersani fails to see the ‘horizonlessness’ (SD, 159) of 
MacKinnon’s writing on sex – that there are no exit signs, no pleasures, and no 
compromises – but also takes him to task for his suggestion that the erotic 
underpinnings of MacKinnon’s account present us with the very qualities of sexuality 
that should be celebrated, because they tell us that sex is bad for you. Rather, argues 
Halley, there is an unmistakenly normative preoccupation underpinning his essay that 
has more in common with cultural feminism than the MacKinnon of the early Signs 
essays. As she points out, what cultural feminism and Bersani share is an 
attentiveness to the question of the sex act itself as politically and even morally 
valuable; that there is ‘something good in sex, something that has been devalued, and 
the reform project is to revalue it’ (SD, 155). In particular, Bersani may stake out 
sex’s masochistic, negative qualities as the root of its experiential jouissance, but he 
nonetheless reaffirms the moral value of pleasure itself, and thus his thesis might be 
described as one that avows compulsory sexuality. What Halley’s thesis misses in 
MacKinnon, though, is that it is at least in part a critique of (hetero)sexual 
compulsory sexuality; the idea that sex itself does not have moral or political value 
for women, either in present reality or any post-patriarchal imaginary.   
More recently, Halberstam has advocated for what s/he terms ‘shadow 
feminisms’, in which negativity, rejection and failure mark a feminist resistance to 
patriarchal modes of becoming woman, and instead encourages modes of 
 12 
‘unbecoming’. While some of the epistemological apparatus of ‘shadow feminisms’ 
re-engage core premises of what has come to be called the anti-social thesis in queer 
theory, Halberstam explicitly rejects the apolitical negativity associated with Bersani, 
but also by inference some of the commitments of sex-radical feminism. S/he 
suggests that a shadow feminism might constitute a means of rejecting normative 
models of ‘success’ that are, of course, measured by white male standards. Some of 
these ‘successes’, we might infer, are connected to demonstrating the possibility of 
women’s sexual pleasure through alternative sexual practices and representations. 
Halberstam does re-engage other feminist renegades of the past, particularly Wittig, 
Spivak and Solanas, and as s/he notes, ‘the feminist archive of the anti-social, 
needless to say, looks far different than the gay male archive deployed by Bersani, 
Edelman and countless others’.25 However, Dworkin and MacKinnon are left 
conspicuously absent from the frame.  
Arguably, Dworkin and Mackinnon take sex as not just the locus of women’s 
unbecoming, but their annihilation.26 It is subordination rather than discrimination 
that is at the heart of the injuries done to women through patriarchy, and the task of 
feminism, to quote Halberstam, might be to ‘unthink sex as that alluring narrative of 
connection and liberation and think of it anew as a site of failure and unbecoming 
conduct’.27 Drawing on postcolonial and black feminist theory, which refuse the 
equation in white Western feminism of sovereignty and freedom, and instances of 
feminist art that take self-destruction as their key motif, Halberstam charts a 
genealogy of feminisms in which the choice offered to women, ‘freedom in liberal 
terms’ (QAF, 129),28 is refused; in which feminism becomes primarily a site of 
‘negation and negativity’ (129). S/he argues for a ‘feminism that fails to save others 
(…) a feminism that finds purpose in its own failure’ (128).  
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Where Halberstam does not venture, however, is a suggestion that sex itself 
might be a site of feminist negation, and it is here that we might join up the queer 
anti-social feminism of The Queer Art of Failure with MacKinnon and Dworkin’s 
thought. As Dworkin notes, sex and, by extension, sexual pleasure is consistently 
promised to women as meaningful and affirmative on two grounds, outlined most 
clearly in Right Wing Women, via the brothel model and farming model. On the one 
hand, because women’s sexuality is shaped by the sensual pleasure of being possessed 
(‘there is no separate being  (…) only the flesh-and-blood reality of being a sensate 
being whose body experiences sexual intensity, sexual pleasure and sexual identity in 
being possessed: in being owned and fucked’ (IC, 77)), it becomes a necessity for the 
maintenance of patriarchy. On the other, because of its proximity to motherhood 
(‘women as a class planted with the male seed and harvested’ (RWW, 174)), sexuality 
is hamstrung by its utility for men. Therefore, in Dworkin’s terms, negation of 
sexuality altogether is the only means of resistance woman has (in MacKinnon’s 
thought, even this negation is conceived as impossible). Even lesbianism, as Grant 
notes, cannot change the ‘structure of women’s exploitation’ (981) for Dworkin. This 
becomes particularly clear in Intercourse in her reading of Joan of Arc, which 
Dworkin reads as a tale of resistance to compulsory sexuality. Joan’s ‘rebel virginity’ 
(IC, 111), she writes, ‘was a renunciation of civil worthlessness rooted in sexual 
practice’ (100). In this feminist retelling, Dworkin notes that Joan was ‘shown the 
instruments of torture’ that would kill her for her hereticism, yet chose to disobey and 
was burnt at the stake. As Dworkin notes, Joan ‘s decision to self-annihilate, rather 
than be coerced into intercourse, designates her heroicised virginity as a site of 
refusal.  
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Two observations might be made here that connect Dworkin’s reading with 
queer theory. The first is that Dworkin’s reading of Joan of Arc has much in common 
with Halberstam’s genealogy of anti-social queer shadow feminists. If the only 
agentic ‘way out’ of exploitation for women, from the burden of either being 
‘brotheled’ or ‘farmed’ through sex, is to negate it entirely, no matter the costs, then 
we might suggest that Joan’s ‘rebel virginity’ made her a shadow feminist. As 
Halberstam notes of Spivak’s critique of Western feminism, perhaps it is the case that 
we have become wilfully blind to forms of resistance that do not conform to Western 
standards of active subversion or resistance. Arguably, sex-radical feminism has had a 
role to play in instituting this blindness, by positioning sexual subversion as a 
representational and practical strategy of queer-feminist resistance.  
A second point of connection might be to look to the burgeoning queer 
literature on asexuality. Cerankowski and Milks argue that Dworkin’s reading of 
Joan, despite her problematic use of ‘virginity’ as synonymous with resistance to 
phallocentric sex, might be seen as an early attempt to theorise asexuality as 
feminist.29 Furthermore, they articulate that Dworkin’s reading demands that 
asexuality cannot be dismissed as conservative, repressive or anti-sexual, but rather 
that it might, by Bersani’s definition, act as one of many myriad ways of being queer: 
By its very definition, asexuality brings a focus to the presence or absence 
of sexual desire as a way to queer the normative conceptions around how 
sex is practiced and how relationships are (or are not) formed around that 
practice (660).  
While the queer conceptualisation of asexuality, as we see above, rests not on 
a refusal of sexuality, it is the negation of sex itself in Dworkin, and the 
horizonlessness of MacKinnon’s writing on sexuality as always already the product of 
 15 
male desire, which demonstrates the misreading of their work by Bersani. Dworkin 
did imagine a ‘sexual intelligence’ for women premised on sexual integrity, and the 
‘honest possession of one’s body’ (RWW, 54), but her post-patriarchal vision of 
sexuality was certainly not pastoral. In Woman Hating, she suggests that there might 
exist a much more expansive sexual universe, in which, for example, the incest taboo 
would in future be undermined by the destruction of the nuclear family and (in a 
Foucauldian twist) the depedagogisation of children’s sexuality. Bestiality, too, would 
flourish.30 Although Dworkin was later to become an ardent critic of de Sade, her 
sexual imaginary in this work sounds oddly Sadean.31 
 
Conclusion 
This article has sought not to ‘redeem’ Dworkin and MacKinnon’s work on sexuality 
entirely, but first to demonstrate its rejection of the equation between sexuality and 
social transformation, so often laid at radical feminists’ feet, and second to contest 
Bersani’s charge that the normative intent of their work is that intercourse itself might 
be redeemed. Even where Dworkin does, albeit briefly, pause on the possibility of 
sexual pleasure post-patriarchy, she is more interested in evacuating sexuality of its 
penetrative and phallocentric properties. Where MacKinnon is concerned, her work is 
much less ambiguous.  The gender division for MacKinnon is premised on ‘those who 
fuck’ and ‘those who get fucked’, but there is no attempt to redeem sexuality from 
this paradigm. As Cornell attests, the irony of MacKinnon’s work lies in the 
association she makes between knowledge, its power to define what woman is, and 
sexuality: 
By definition, the one who knows, for MacKinnon, can only be the 
fuckor. Knowledge as conquest. And yet she announces what woman is: 
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fuckee. But how can MacKinnon, a fuckee, know at all? She is the object. 
Feminist knowledge is, by her definition, impossible. (BA, 141) 
Thus, if women’s sexuality is merely the product of male knowledge, not only is there 
no redemptive or normative intention in MacKinnon’s writing, but her own voice is 
stymied by the same problem. A similar accusation might be levelled at Dworkin’s 
analogy between penetration, pleasure and annihilation. The suggestion that women’s 
experience of sexual pleasure is determined by male possession is ultimately guilty of 
‘subscribing to the heroics of phallic mystique’.32 Even if both Dworkin and 
MacKinnon ground their critique not in the material act of sex and its immutable 
properties but rather in its cultural (Dworkin) and legal (MacKinnon) significations, 
this relies on a masculinist construction of knowledge and subjectivity.  
If we accept these critiques, we can begin to comprehend the inheritance of 
Dworkin and MacKinnon’s work in Bersani’s queer theory. Nonetheless, to return to 
Halley, though her reading of Bersani is fully cognisant of his debt to MacKinnon, 
she suggests that what is ‘not feminist’ in his text is the way it speaks quite 
specifically to gay men (SD, 156). However, if MacKinnon’s theory of sexuality does 
indeed rely on phallocentric configurations, we might read ISG? not as a queer 
reversal of her thesis, but instead as an extension of it. If MacKinnon’s reading of 
sexuality presumes the feminine as ‘doomed’ to be constrained to masculine 
definition, and Dworkin’s reading presumes feminine sexual pleasure as annihilation 
of self, then Bersani’s argument articulates the normative value of sex for women just 
as for men. While Bersani authors his text specifically to advocate against feminist 
and queer attempts to ‘redeem’ the sexuality of gay men, MacKinnon and Dworkin’s 
work makes a more compelling case for an anti-social irredeemable sexuality than 
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